Studies have shown that when two information providers or outside auditors exist, the value provided by the second one will be decreased by the actions of the first.
Introduction
The value of the ratings provided by credit rating agencies like Standard and Poor's or Moody's is a topic of continuing debate. This paper uses credit ratings of bank loans to examine two different, but interrelated issues. First, investor reaction to bank loan credit rating announcements is specifically examined to determine if the credit rating itself provides new information to the market. Second, are credit rating agencies merely providing duplicate information already available through the bank certification provided by the loan being granted or renewed.
Credit ratings have been argued to contain no more than publicly-available information (Wakeman (1984) ) and rating agencies to exist only because of regulatory requirements (Partnoy (1999) and (2002) and White (2001)). Some early empirical studies support the point of view that ratings do not provide any additional information (Weinstein (1977) , Wakeman (1978) and Pinches and Singleton (1978) ). However, more recent empirical studies find that the capital markets do react to the rating announcements, specifically to news of a deteriorated position (Wansley and Clauretie (1985) , Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) , Glascock, Davidson, and Henderson (1987) , Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) , Nayar and Rozeff (1994) and Elayan, Maris, and Young (1996) ). Most of the studies use bond ratings or commercial paper ratings, implying that the number of security holders is large. If the costs of collecting information or providing monitoring services are high due to the large number of security holders, as suggested by Wakeman (1984) and Boot and Milbourn (2002) , then rating agencies may provide value by reducing these costs.
Theoretical studies of financial intermediaries support the signalling power of banks as information providers, either through certification because of specialized information (Leland and Pyle (1977) , Campbell and Kracaw (1980) and Kanatas (1987) ) or from monitoring due to an ongoing relationship (Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) , Diamond (1984) and Fama (1985) ). Empirical studies in general, support the theoretical points of view and find abnormal market reaction to the initiation or renewal of bank loans (Mikkelson and Partch (1986), James (1987) , Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1992) ). Information about a firm's financial position is signalled to the capital market by banks through announcements of loan initiations and/or renewals. Furthermore, during the life of a bank loan the borrower is also monitored by the bank. A question of interest is whether the subsequent credit rating of a bank loan provides duplicate information and therefore is unlikely to generate market reaction?
Banks and rating agencies have many common functions and operate similarly. These similarities include information collection through access to private information based on their relationships with clients, certifying client creditworthiness to the capital market and monitoring their clients on an ongoing basis. Evidence in Ederington, Yawitz, and Roberts (1987) , Hsueh and Liu (1992) and Best and Zhang (1993) suggests that when more than one information provider exists the initial indication will weaken the power of second one. It is possible therefore, that the value of rating agencies will be reduced because the signalling and monitoring roles are already provided by financial intermediaries. However, Nayar and Rozeff (1994) , Stover (1996) , and Schweitzer, Szewczky, and Varma (1992) , find that rating agencies perform their certifying and monitoring roles in a different way than banks do. In addition, Diamond (1984) and Seward (1990) suggest that the recent trend of securitization that makes (presumably) illiquid bank loans marketable, transfers the intermediated contracts into direct contracts. Monitoring by banks may therefore be dampened and transferred to the second auditors, i.e., the rating agencies.
The principal hypothesis tested is that the market will react significantly to announcements of bank loan ratings with either positive or negative implications. An abnormal reaction is found for bad news events only, as in most previous empirical studies. Specifically these announcements are rating placements on the CreditWatch list with a negative implication, and rating downgrade actions. The greatest value of rating agencies seems to be conveying information regarding a deterioration in financial position, rather than identifying improvements.
Further, credit rating agencies and banks do not provide duplicate information since credit rating announcements still generate significant abnormal market returns.
A review of the literature covering the functions of financial intermediaries and rating agencies, as well as the interactive relationship between them, is presented in Section 2. The hypotheses tested and a discussion of announcement effects and control variables used in univariate tests and the multivariate regressions are discussed in Section 3. Data description and the methods of analysis are presented in Section 4. The empirical results of the event study, univariate tests, and multivariate regressions are covered in Section 5. Section 6 presents conclusions.
A Review of the Literature

The Function of Financial Intermediaries
Two important roles of financial intermediaries are those of certification and monitoring.
The certification role indicates that the lending activity by a bank signals a firm's quality and its creditworthiness. This theory suggests that banks have access to inside information that is not available to the market, giving them a competitive advantage in evaluating firm value. Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that bank willingness to invest in a company signals to the market the true quality of its projects, based on the bank's specialized information. Campbell and Kracaw (1980) state that in a market with asymmetric information where direct signals by the owners of assets are difficult to convey, the purchase of those assets can produce information about their value and hence give a provide to the market. Kanatas (1987) notes that corporations often procure a loan commitment just before selling dealer-placed commercial paper. He explains that obtaining a loan commitment can reduce the borrowing costs, because it reveals the bank's private information about the issuing company's credit risk to the commercial paper market.
The other source of signalling power comes from a bank's monitoring role, based on its continuing relationship and interaction with its corporate clients. Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) discuss the roles of information production and internal monitoring of financial intermediaries. Diamond (1984 Diamond ( , 1996 develops the delegated monitoring model that diversification within an intermediation minimizes the cost of monitoring information and solves the incentive problem between borrowers and lenders. Fama (1985) contends that the ongoing history of a borrower as a depositor gives banks inside information and a comparative advantage in initiating and monitoring the loans at lower costs, especially the repeated short-term ones.
Furthermore, signals from short-term bank loans about firm creditworthiness avoid the duplication of information costs and lower the costs from other sources. Rajan and Winton (1995) further suggest that both covenants and collateral can be used for structuring the loan contracts to increase the banks' incentive to monitor. Finally, Diamond (1991) makes the case that because of information asymmetry and moral hazard a new borrower will seek a loan from financial intermediaries first, and after gaining a reputation through monitoring, switches to directly-placed debt. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and James (1987) find significant market reaction to new bank loan agreements. These results are consistent with the theories of financial intermediation and attest to the uniqueness of bank loans. However, Lummer and McConnell (1989) differentiate the announcements into new loans versus loan renewals and find significantly positive reaction only to renewals. Their result for loan renewals is consistent with Fama's (1985) theory that information is transmitted through the continuing lending relationship with a company, not in making the initial lending decision. Slovin, Sushka and Hudson (1990) examine the market reaction to announcements of seasoned stock offerings in the presence of outside agents and conclude that use of extensive bank financing by the stock-issuing company reflects its willingness to be monitored by a reputable outsider. Slovin, et al. (1992) examine the effect of bank loan announcements by companies with different sizes. The results of their study support the hypothesis that banks have no comparative advantage in monitoring large, well-established firms. They conclude that small firms receive the greatest benefit from bank certification and monitoring as proposed by Diamond (1991 ). Johnson (1997 and Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999) also find evidence of benefits due to bank monitoring. In summary, the issue and renewal of the bank loans send signals to the capital market. Obtaining bank loans provide a certification signal to the market about the firms' true creditworthiness and the renewal process provides monitoring benefits.
Information Effects of Credit Ratings
The function of rating agencies has long been debated and the conclusion remains unclear.
First, rating agencies may provide an initial low-cost assessment of the creditworthiness of the issuing company by analyzing the company's statements and providing an independent judgment. Second, they monitor the issuing company over the life of bond. Wakeman (1984) argues that bond rating changes only provide information that is already reflected in the bond price, but investors demand the ratings due to the role played by rating agencies is "reputable auditors". Partnoy (1999 Partnoy ( , 2002 and White (2001) suggest that regulatory dependence on credit ratings is the explanation for the paradox of credit rating industry, i.e., the continuing usage of credit rating agency services in the face of the declining informational value of ratings. Boot and Milbourn (2002) state that credit ratings serve to coordinate the agencies' monitoring role with regulatory requirements and this function is significant even if the ratings may contain little information.
While the theoretical studies generally argue that ratings provide only publicly-available information, most empirical studies tend to show that rating agencies provide additional information to the capital market in some way. In general, there are three kinds of rating agency actions, namely rating assignments, placement on the CreditWatch list, and rating changes. The following empirical review is presented in that order. Nayar and Rozeff (1994) provide evidence that the equity market responds favorably to superior rating assignments, but does not respond to those with lower quality ratings. Barron, Clare, and Thomas (1997) find no evidence that assignment of a new long-term rating has a significant impact on stock return volatility or systematic risk for United Kingdom (UK) firms.
Conversely, Elayan, Hsu and Meyer (2003) do find significant positive market reaction to credit rating assignments for New Zealand (NZ) firms.
The CreditWatch list was introduced by Standard and Poor's to provide timely information indicating the possible direction of future company rating changes. Wansley and Clauretie (1985) find significant (marginally significant) reaction to those CreditWatch placement announcements with subsequent rating downgrades (upgrades), while there is no market reaction to those with a subsequent rating affirmation. Similar results are obtained from bond price reaction, but the bond market does not appear as efficient as the equity market. Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) detect significantly negative abnormal performance for placements with a negative implication, and marginally significant positive abnormal return for placement with a positive indication. Hand et al. (1992) find placements with negative implications cause significantly negative abnormal equity returns, but no significant response to placements with positive implications. Elayan, et al. (1996) develop a similar result for commercial paper. However, Barron et al. (1997) 
examine
CreditWatch list placements with negative implications for UK firms and find insignificant market reaction. Elayan, et al. (2003) find a significant negative reaction to placements with negative implications for NZ firms, but unlike previous studies also find a significant positive reaction to placements with positive implications.
One viewpoint from the theoretical studies is that rating agencies can only access publiclyavailable information, therefore the announcement of rating changes should not cause any abnormal market reaction. Weinstein (1977) examines monthly bond returns, and finds no significant price reaction during the month of the change, six months prior and after the change.
Similarly, insignificant price reactions are found by Wakeman (1978) using weekly bond returns and monthly stock returns, and Pinches and Singleton (1978) using monthly stock returns.
In contrast, some empirical studies support the conclusion that rating agencies do provide information to the capital market. For example, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) find that only announcements of rating downgrades are associated with significantly negative abnormal returns. Glascock et al. (1987) and Hand et al. (1992) find statistically significant negative (insignificant positive) stock returns for rating downgrades (upgrades). Matolcsy and Lianto (1995) use Australian data and Barron et al. (1997) use UK data and confirm that only bond rating downgrades provide additional information to the equity market. Elayan, et al. (2003) find not only negative reaction to downgrades, but also significant positive reaction to upgrades for NZ firms. Dichev and Piotroski (2001) investigate long run returns following bond rating changes, and find significant negative (insignificant positive) reaction to downgrades (upgrades). Nayar and Rozeff (1994), Elayan et al. (1996) , Nayar and Rozeff (1996) and Chandra and Nayar (1998) find results for commercial paper that are similar to previous studies of bond ratings, i.e., statistically significant negative stock price reactions to rating downgrades, but not to rating upgrades. These results suggest that rating downgrades convey new valuable information to the market, while upgrades do not.
The Interaction between Financial Intermediaries and Rating Agencies
Banks and credit rating agencies perform common services and function similarly in many ways. A question is whether these two information providers communicate duplicate information to the capital market. Best and Zhang (1993) examine announcements of bank loan agreements and financial analysts' earnings forecast error percentages. They conclude that if the other source of information is reliable and is provided first, then banks provide little information to the capital market. Ederington et al. (1987) and Hsueh and Liu (1992) reach a similar conclusion that the announcement effect of rating changes depends on the quantity and quality of existing information available in the market. Nayar and Rozeff (1994) conclude that the certification role by rating agencies is different from that of banks. They find that companies having both higher credit ratings and letters of credit have significantly greater market reaction than those with lower ratings and no letters of credit. Stover (1996) investigates the interaction between banks and rating agencies by examining standby letters of credit and bond ratings for newly-issued tax-exempt bonds. The certification effect of the banks is confirmed as the market reacts positively to employment of the standby letter of credit and to the quality of the banks.
Monitoring is another common role of both rating agencies and banks. Arguing that bank holding companies (BHC) are monitored by both of bank regulators and rating agencies, Schweitzer et al. (1992) use 95 announcements of changes in BHC debt ratings between 1977 and 1987 to examine whether rating agencies still produce additional information. They find that announcements of downgrades (upgrades) are associated with statistically significant negative (marginally significant positive) abnormal returns. There is no evidence that there is any differential market reaction to the rating changes between bank holding companies and unregulated industrial firms. They conclude that rating agencies do provide information to the capital market, and their monitoring service is not dampened by the monitoring activities of bank regulators.
Testable Hypotheses
Rating Announcement Effects
Bank loans being granted or renewed have been both hypothesized to provide new information (cf. Leland and Pyle (1977) , Campbell and Kracaw (1980) , Fama (1985) and Kanatas (1987) , etc.) regarding borrower creditworthiness and empirically shown to generate abnormal market reaction (Mikkelson and Partch (1986) , James (1987) , and Lummer and McConnell (1989) , among others). The limited evidence (eg. Nayer and Rozeff (1994), Barron et al. (1997) and Elayan et al. (2003) ) regarding market reaction to the assignment of a rating to bond or commercial paper issues is mixed as to whether these provide new information. Furthermore, a signal that essentially duplicates an earlier one typically has been shown to have lesser impact, as in Ederington et al. (1987) , Hsueh and Liu (1992) and Best and Zhang (1993) . On these bases, credit rating assignments that occur subsequent to a bank loan initiation or renewal may be thought to provide both duplicate and potentially superceded information. This train of thought leads to the first hypothesis tested in this research. Hypothesis 1: The announcement of a bank loan credit rating assignment is not expected to generate a significantly positive or negative equity market reaction.
After assigning ratings, rating agencies will examine the client firms regularly, and respond to any events that may influence the companies' financial position, A significant change in financial position may lead to placement on the CreditWatch list. This event may or may not then lead to the action of a change in rating. If the loan is held by the issuing bank throughout its life and is already being monitored by the bank, then the rating agency, as the second auditor, may provide a less important signal to the capital market through rating placements or rating action announcements, again as suggested by Ederington et al. (1987) , Hsueh and Liu (1992) , and Best and Zhang (1993) . However, Schweitzer et al. (1992) , Rozeff (1994) and Stover (1996) suggest that rating agencies provide different services than banks. Thus, placement of bank loans on CreditWatch or rating changes still provide additional information to the capital market. Which effect is likely to dominate is an empirical question. However, given the findings of most previous researchers, there is no particular reason to suspect there will be a significant reaction to anything but news of a deteriorating position, i.e., placements with a negative implication or a ratings downgrade. This logic leads to the following hypothesis regarding
CreditWatch placements. Hypothesis 2: The announcement of a CreditWatch placement with a negative (positive) implication for a bank loan rating is expected to be associated with a significantly negative (positive, but insignificant) equity market reaction.
In like manner, and for essentially the same reasons the third hypothesis in regard to rating actions is developed as follows. Hypothesis 3: The announcement of a bank loan rating downgrade (upgrade or affirmation) is expected to be associated with significantly negative (positive, but insignificant or insignificant) equity market reaction.
Control Variables
The variables discussed below are used in the univariate tests (each sample is split into above-, and below-median groups, for discrete variables or different groups as described for dummy variables) and multivariate regressions. The expected signs for each variable in the multivariate regressions are also discussed in this section.
Information asymmetry is measured by Tobin's Q (TQ), and is calculated as long-term debt plus the market value of equity divided by (book value of) total assets. Higher TQ ratios are taken to indicate greater information asymmetry. Hsueh and Liu (1992) find that rating change announcements have a stronger impact for firms with less information available to the market. Krishnaswami et al. (1999) find the benefits from monitoring accrue more to the firms with greater information asymmetry. In univariate tests the group with higher (above median) TQ ratios are therefore expected to be associated with stronger market reaction, and the difference between above-and below-median groups should be statistically significant. This difference should therefore have a negative (positive) sign for bad (good) news eg. CreditWatch placements with negative (positive) implications and rating downgrades (upgrades). In multivariate regressions it is expected that TQ should have a negative (positive) relationship with market reaction for bad (good) news announcements.
Size (SIZE) is a common variable included in the cross-sectional tests in previous studies because of the well-known size effect and it is measured by the log of total assets. Large companies are usually followed by large group of investors, which will reduce information asymmetry. Therefore the market reaction associated with large firms should be less strong than for smaller ones (Slovin et al., 1992 , and Fama, 1985 , cited in Dichev and Piotroski, 2001 ). In the univariate tests the below-median size group should be associated with significantly stronger market reaction and the difference should be positive (negative) for bad (good) news. In multivariate regressions the relationship between market reaction and firm size is expected to be positive (negative) for bad (good) news.
Leverage (LEV) is typically thought to be an important measurement of a firm's financial position. A company with more leverage faces greater financial risk, and this increases the probability of default. Kliger and Sarig (2000) find that the impact of rating information is greater for high-leveraged firms than for low-leveraged ones. LEV is proxied by long-term debt divided by total equity. In the tests the group with above-median leverage is thereby expected to be associated with stronger market reaction. The expected univariate and regression results are therefore the same as described above for TQ.
Interest coverage is one major difference between bank loan ratings and corporate credit ratings (Bailey (1999) ). In addition to the evaluations done via corporate credit ratings, bank loan ratings take into account the characteristics of loans, such as collateral, covenants, and term structures. Therefore, bank loan ratings expressly evaluate the flow of earnings or cash that is available to repay the interest on outstanding obligations. Times interest earned (TIE) describes a company's ability to pay interest from operating income and is used to measure coverage in this study. It is calculated as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total debt interest. A lower TIE ratio suggests a greater probability that a company will fail to meet its obligation to creditors. Thus, the below-median TIE group should be associated with a stronger market reaction, and therefore the expected univariate and regression results are the same as those described above for SIZE.
Liquidity is particularly important in evaluating short-term financial position or short-term security. Usually bank loans are viewed as shorter-term instruments (Preece and Millineaux (1994) ). Elayan et al. (1996) find a strong positive relationship between the current ratio (CRATIO) and commercial paper ratings. CRATIO, unlike leverage and TIE ratios measuring long-term debt management, is specifically used to measure a firm's ability to meet its short-term obligations. The CRATIO is calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities. A higher CRATIO indicates greater liquidity, and a smaller probability that the company will fail to meet its obligation to short-term creditors. Here again, the below-median CRATIO should be associated with a stronger market reaction and the expected univariate and regression results are the same as those described above for SIZE.
Profitability ratios show the combined effects of liquidity, asset and debt management.
Return on equity (ROE) is used in this study and it is calculated as net income divided by market value of equity. Investors are theorized to be more sensitive to those companies with lower profitability. The below-median ROE group should thereby generate a stronger market reaction and the expected univariate and regression results are the same as those described above for SIZE.
Rating points (RATP) are used for the sample of rating assignments and placements on the CreditWatch list. A number is assigned to each rating, from 28 (AAA) to 1 (D). Diamond (1991) suggests that firms with middle or lower ratings are most able to take advantage of acquiring reputational capital from the outside auditors. The below-median RATP group should be associated with greater market reaction and again the expectations for the univariate and regression tests are the same as those for SIZE.
The change in rating points (∆RATP) is used for the rating action sample. It is calculated as new rating points minus old rating points. It therefore is negative (positive) for rating downgrades (upgrades), and is zero for affirmations. This variable is found to be significant in Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) , Schweitzer et al. (1992) , Hand et al. (1992) , Matolcsy and Lianto (1995) , Elayan et al. (1996) and Barron et al. (1997) . In the tests the group with larger absolute values of ∆RATP should be associated with stronger market reaction.
1
The lowest rating to qualify as investment grade (INVG) is BBB-by S&P (Baa3 by Moody's). Many institutional investors, pension funds for example, are restricted to investing in above-investment-grade securities. If investment grade is viewed as a benchmark of bank loan credit quality, it can be expected that any creditworthiness announcement effects will be stronger for firms with below-investment-grade ratings (cf. Hand et al., 1992, and Dichev and Piotroski, 2001 ). In the regressions a dummy variable is set to one if the rating is below-investment and is zero, otherwise. In the tests the below-INVG group should be associated with a stronger market reaction. The univariate and regression results are expected to be the same as those described above for SIZE.
Across or within class (CLASS) is as a control variable for the sample of rating downgrades and upgrades. Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) detect abnormal negative excess returns only for the sub-sample of downgrade announcements that are across class, but not those within class. This variable is also employed by Hsueh and Liu (1992) and Barron et al. (1997) . In the tests the group with rating changes across class are expected to be associated with a stronger market reaction. For the univariate tests the difference between CAARs for rating changes across class, versus within class, are expected to be significantly negative (positive) for bad (good) news announcements. In the multivariate regressions the dummy variable CLASS is set to one for the announcements of across-class changes, and is zero otherwise. It is expected that the relationship between CLASS and market reaction should be negative (positive) for bad (good) news.
Across investment grade (ACINV) is used for rating actions to test whether an upgrade (downgrade) action that moves a bank loan rating into (out of) investment grade is associated with a larger price response (Holthausen and Leftwich (1985) ). This variable is also used by Hand et al. (1992) and Matolcsy and Lianto (1995) . In univariate tests the group with rating changes across INVG should be associated with a stronger market reaction. The difference ACINV minus non-ACINV should significantly negative (positive) for bad (good) news announcements. In the multivariate regressions, the dummy variable ACINV takes the value one for those rating changes across investment grade, and is zero otherwise. The relationship between ACINV and market reaction is expected to be negative (positive) for bad (good) news.
Data Description and Methods of Analysis
Data Description
Announcements of bank loan rating assignments, CreditWatch placements, and rating The primary announcement data satisfies the following requirements. First, the companies having bank loan rating announcements are included in the CRSP database (or, have a CUSIP number). Second, daily returns are available for the period of 240 days before, to 15 days after, the announcement date. Third, no other confounding announcements occurred within the threeday window from one day before, to one day after the announcement date of the bank loan rating.
The initial sample of 4,442 announcements of bank loan ratings is subjected to the above criteria to produce the final sample of 571 announcements. 3 In the placement subset, for example, contamination effects lead to deletion of more than half the number of those announcements. Insert Table 2 about here.
Methods of Analysis
There are three types of tests employed in this study. First, a traditional event study method is used to examine whether bank loan credit ratings generate abnormal excess returns. Second, univariate tests are used to determine if there are significant differences between announcementperiod returns split on the basis of relevant variables into above-and below-median groups.
Third, multivariate regression analysis is used to provide evidence on whether any of the hypothesized control variables offer significant explanatory value for the announcement-period equity returns. 4 Initially Standard and Poor's used a scale of one through 10, where one was the highest, for the bank loan ratings. The correlation of bank loan ratings with the traditional scale follows. AAA, AA+, AA, AA-= 1; A+, A, A-= 2; BBB+, BBB = 3; BBB-, BB+ = 3 or 4 or 5; BB, BB-= 4 or 5 or 6; B+, B = 5 or 6 or 7; B-= 6 or 7 or 8, CCC+, CCC, CCC-= 8; CC, C = 9; and D = 10 (Dow Jones Interactive June 5, 1996). 5 Note: These numbers do not match the totals in Table 2 for the reasons that follow. In addition to the rating changes, an announcement is also counted (in Table 2 ) as a downgrade (upgrade) if its outlook is changed when no rating is provided or the rating action is affirmed. There are three outlook types, i.e., negative, positive and stable. There are 17 announcements of an outlook downgrade (5 from positive to stable and 12 from stable to negative) and 21 announcements of an outlook upgrade (10 from stable to positive and 11 from negative to stable).
Event Study Tests for Abnormal Returns
The market model is used to estimate the abnormal security returns associated with bank loan rating assignments, CreditWatch placements and action announcements. The intercept and slope coefficients that are used in the market model are estimated over a 150-day period, from day t-240 to day t-91, relative to the announcement day (t=0). The standardized abnormal return approach is used to generate z-test statistics (SCS Z) as in Patell (1976) . The generalized sign test (GSIGN Z) is used to test for the fraction of positive and negative average abnormal returns. The null hypothesis for the GSIGN Z is that the fraction of positive returns is the same as in the estimation period. An example of the GSIGN Z is presented by Cowan (1992) . Univariate tests are used to test for significant differences in cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) between groups split on the basis of the different variables described in the preceding section.
Multivariate Regression Models
Multivariate regressions are used to determine if the control variables described previously offer any ability to explain the cumulative, average abnormal returns (CAAR) for the credit rating announcements. In these regressions the dependent variable is the three-day (day t-1 to day t+1)
CAAR. The assignment, placement, and action announcement regression models are as shown below. The expected signs for each variable have been discussed in the last section, and these are shown in the tables depicting the regression results. The models for rating assignments and placements, and rating actions, is given in (1) and (2), respectively, and the variables employed have been described previously. CAAR = α 0 + α 1 TQ + α 2 SIZE + α 3 LEV 6 + α 4 TIE + α 5 CRATIO + α 6 ROE 7 + α 7 RATP
CAAR = α 0 + α 1 TQ + α 2 SIZE + α 3 LEV + α 4 TIE + α 5 CRATIO + α 6 ROE + α 7 ∆RATP + α 8 INVG + α 9 CLASS + α 10 ACINV + ε.
Empirical Results
Market Reaction to Bank Loan Rating Announcements
The event study results for the 265 announcements of bank loan rating assignments are shown in the top section of Table 3 . The average abnormal returns (AAR), median abnormal returns (MAR), the number of positive versus negative abnormal returns, SCS Z and GSIGN Z are reported from the day before (t-1), to the day after (+1) the announcement date. Cumulative returns are also provided for various windows of interest. The three-day CAAR and cumulative median abnormal returns (CMAR) are -0.25% (-0.45%), with an SCS z-test statistic of -0.763 which is insignificant. The ratio of positive to negative returns is 76:89, and the GSIGN Z is insignificant at -0.254. Further, this nearly even ratio of positive to negative returns suggests that a credit rating assignment is neither a uniformly good news or bad news event. These findings support Hypothesis 1 that the announcement of a bank loan rating assignment provides duplicate information and it is not associated with a significant abnormal market reaction.
Insert Table 3 about here. Table 3 also reports a summary of the event study output for the announcements of bank loan rating placements on the CreditWatch list. The middle panel reports the results for the 32 placements with a negative implication. The three-day CAAR is -2.79%, which yields a SCS ztest statistic of -2.974 (significant at the 1% level). The ratio of positive to negative returns is 8:24, and the GSIGN Z is -2.714, which is similarly significant. The two-day CAARs are also significant. Therefore, the results support Hypothesis 2 that announcements of bank loan rating placements with a negative implication are expected to be associated with a significant negative abnormal market reaction. This finding is consistent with Barron et al. (1997) .
The lower panel reports the output for the 7 placement announcements with a positive implication. The three-day CAAR (CMAR) is 0.36% (1.82%), with a z-test statistic (0.385) that is insignificant. The ratio of positive to negative returns is 4:3, and the GSIGN Z is 0.556. The results for the two-day event window are not significant either. Consistent with previous studies, the results support the relevant part of Hypothesis 2 that these positive placement announcements of bank loan ratings are expected to be associated with a positive but insignificant abnormal market reaction. However, this sample is too small to base any conclusion. Glascock et al. (1987) , Hand et al. (1992) , Nayar and Rozeff (1994) , and Elayan et al. (1996) .
The middle panel (of Table 3 that announcements of bank loan rating affirmations are expected to be associated with an insignificant abnormal market reaction.
Univariate Tests of Returns based on Control Variables
The left-hand side of Table 4 provides the univariate results for tests of significant differences in the Assignment CAARs split on the basis of the control variables (i.e., TQ, SIZE, LEV, TIE, CRATIO, BEP, RATP and INVG). In these tests the difference between the above-, and below-median groups is significant for LEV, TIE and RATP at the 10% level. The result for LEV is not as expected since firms with above-median leverage were predicted to experience a greater reaction. For TIE since both CAARs are negative the positive difference does accord with expectations that firms having a sub-par interest coverage ratio will experience a more extreme market reaction. The RATP result does reflect a more positive reaction from a relatively higher rating assignment as is expected.
On the right-hand side of Table 4 the univariate test statistics for CreditWatch placements with a negative implication are shown. 8 All of the above-and below-median CAARs are negative since this is a bad news event. The differences are significant for TQ (10% level), TIE (10%), BEP (1%) and INVG (5%). The below-median TIE and BEP, and non-investment grade groups have a more negative reaction as predicted. Contrary to expectations, the above-median TQ group which is meant to reflect greater information asymmetry has a less negative reaction.
Insert Table 4 about here. Insert Table 5 about here.
The center section of Table 5 shows the test statistics for rating upgrades. Three variables generate significant differences, namely CRATIO (10% level), CLASS (1%) and ACINV (10%), but only the CRATIO difference has the expected sign. Both the across CLASS and across investment-grade groups generate a negative CAAR which is surprising since these events should be "better" news than their counterparts. Admittedly the ACINV across group only has three observations making any conclusion somewhat suspect in this regard.
The univariate results for rating affirmations are shown in the right-hand side of Table 5 .
Due to the nature of an affirmation significant differences between the groups are not necessarily expected and two significant differences are observed. The TIE difference z-statistic suggests that firms with above-median TIEs experience a significantly more negative market reaction. The significant z-statistic for the ROE difference may be interpreted as showing that more profitable firms suffer more from a ratings affirmation.
Regression Tests of Market Reaction to Credit Rating Announcements
Two multivariate regression models 9 that attempt to explain the three-day CAAR during the bank loan rating assignment period are shown in Table 6 . The LEV parameter estimates turn out to be significantly different from zero in both models using both the standard t-test and the White 10 (1980) test statistics and they have the expected negative sign. Additionally, the ROE variable is significant in model 2 based on the White test statistic. Thus, firms with more leverage experience less positive or more negative reaction upon the rating assignment while the opposite is true for firm profitability. The F-test value for model 1 (model 2) is 2.22 (3.08) and is significant at the 5% (1%) level. However, the adjusted R-squares indicate low explanatory power for the overall regressions.
Insert Table 6 about here. expectations. This result may be interpreted as showing that firms with lower information asymmetry, lower leverage and higher profitability are more adversely impacted by being negatively-placed on the CreditWatch list. The F-values for both models are insignificant and the values for the adjusted R-squares suggest the regression models offer little explanatory power for the announcement-period market reaction. These results may be partially due to the rather small number of observations (33) in this group.
Insert Table 7 about here. Table 8 provides the results for two multivariate regressions that attempt to explain the three-day CAAR bank loan rating downgrades. Two upgrade regression models are also included in the table for the sake of brevity. For downgrades the SIZE variable is marginally significant using both the t-test and White test statistics. However, this variable's sign is expected to be positive. Therefore, this result does not suggest that a rating downgrade generates a more negative response for small firms. In model 2, the ROE variable is also significant (White test) and its sign is positive as expected. The F-values for both models are insignificant although for model 2 it nearly reaches 10% significance. The nearly-zero Adjusted R-squares suggest little explanatory power.
The LEV, ∆RATP and CLASS variables are significant for the both Model 1 and 2 upgrade regressions. However, none of these variables has the expected sign. These significant results may be interpreted as (rather perversely) suggesting that investors are less impressed when firms with a larger upgrade and/or an upgrade into a higher class are upgraded. The results for LEV can be interpreted as showing that investors find announcements of a rating upgrade to be more informative for less-leveraged firms. Model 1 (2) generates a(n) insignificant (significant at the 5% level) F-test. The Adjusted R-squares in these two regressions are 0.095 and 0.135, respectively. These two regressions suggest the greatest explanatory ability of any similar tests conducted in this research.
Insert Table 8 about here.
Conclusion
Credit ratings of bank loans present a unique opportunity to examine whether rating agencies duplicate existing information or convey any additional value to the capital market. This question arises because of the highly-similar functions of certification and monitoring performed by both financial intermediaries and rating agencies.
Consistent evidence is provided that in spite of bank signals already in place, negative announcements by rating agencies provide useful information to the capital market. This information transmission proves to be significant only for the negative signals implicit in rating downgrades and placements on the CreditWatch list with negative implications.
These results suggest that the information provided by rating agencies must be different from that developed by banks. Otherwise, there would be no significant abnormal market reaction to any type of announcement by credit rating agencies regarding loans that are already being monitored or certified by banks. The findings in this study also suggest that the value of rating agencies (a la Schweitzer et al. (1992) ) depend most on recognizing the deterioration in the firm's financial position and conveying this news to the market. This conclusion is supported by the finding that the identification of improving fortunes by the credit rating agencies does not generate a significant reaction. 
Table 1 Frequency Distribution of Bank Loan Rating Announcements by Years
The final sample of 571 announcements are collected during the period of 1996 to 2002. The sample size is particularly small in 1996 because the rating agencies started to rate bank loans from the middle of 1996. All are shown with the number (No.) of events by year and its percentage. The categorization of each rating is based on the format employed by Standard and Poor's. Ratings provided by other agencies are transformed into a Standard and Poor's equivalent. All are shown with the number (No.) of events by ratings and their percentage of the total within each category. N is the number of observations. AAR is the average abnormal return. MAR is the median abnormal return. Pos: Neg shows how many of the firm returns are positive or negative on a given day. SCS Z is the statistic testing for a significant difference of the average abnormal return from zero. GSIGN Z is the generalized sign Z, which is the non-parametric test statistic for a significant difference from zero that considers the ratio of positive to negative returns. AAR and MAR are from the market model using the standardized residual method. CAAR is the equally weighted cumulative average abnormal return, and CMAR is the median cumulative abnormal return. Sign is the expected sign of the difference. N is the number of returns for a given category. CAAR is the percentage, three-day (t-1, t+1) cumulative average abnormal return. Z-test is the test statistic testing for a significant difference between the CAAR and zero. TQ is Tobin's Q, which is the sum of total liabilities and market value of equity divided by book total assets. SIZE is the log of total assets. LEV is long-term debt divided by total equity. TIE is times interest earned calculated as earnings before interest and taxes divided by long-term debt interest. CRATIO is the current ratio. ROE is return on equity calculated as net income divided by market value of equity. RATP is rating points. INVG is investment grade. Difference is the above median CAAR minus the below median CAAR, or as specified otherwise. Sign is the expected sign of the difference. N is the number of returns for a given category. CAAR is the percentage, threeday (t-1, t+1) cumulative average abnormal return. Z-test is the test statistic testing for a significant difference between the CAAR and zero. TQ is Tobin's Q, which is the sum of total liabilities and market value of equity divided by book total assets. SIZE is the log of total assets. LEV is long-term debt divided by total equity. TIE is times interest earned calculated as earnings before interest and taxes divided by long-term debt interest. CRATIO is the current ratio. Return on equity (ROE) is net income divided by market value of equity. ∆RATP is the change in rating points. INVG is investment grade. Difference is Above median CAAR minus the Below median CAAR, or as specified otherwise. NA means not applicable. The dependent variable is the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) during the three-day (day t-1, day t+1) assignment announcement period. Ind. Var. is the independent variable. Exp. Sign is the expected sign of each independent variable. Par. Est. refers to the parameter estimate. T-stat is the tstatistic testing whether the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero. Adj R 2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination, squared. N is the number of announcements in a given category. TQ is Tobin's Q, which is the sum of total liabilities and market value of equity divided by book total assets. SIZE is the log of total assets. LEV is long-term debt divided by total equity. TIE is times interest earned calculated as earnings before interest and taxes divided by long-term debt interest. CRATIO is the current ratio. Return on equity (ROE) is net income divided by market value of equity. RATP is rating points. INVG is investment grade. NA means not applicable. ***, **, *, and $ indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. . N is the number of announcement in a given category. TQ is Tobin's Q, which is the sum of total liabilities and market value of equity divided by book total assets. SIZE is the log of total assets. LEV is long-term debt divided by total equity. TIE is times interest earned calculated as earnings before interest and taxes divided by long-term debt interest. CRATIO is the current ratio. Return on equity (ROE) is net income divided by market value of equity. RATP is rating points. INVG is dummy variable that equals to one if the rating is below investment grade, and zero otherwise. NA is not applicable. ***, **, *, and $ indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) during the three-day period (day t-1, day t+1) of action announcements. Ind. Var. is the independent variable. Sign is the expected sign of each independent variable. Par. Est. is the parameter estimate. Adj R 2 refers to adjusted R 2 . N is the number of announcement in a given category. TQ is Tobin's Q, which is the sum of total liabilities and market value of equity divided by book total assets. SIZE is the log of total assets. LEV is long-term debt divided by total equity. TIE is times interest earned calculated as earnings before interest and taxes divided by long-term debt interest. CRATIO is the current ratio. Return on equity (ROE) is net income divided by market value of equity. ∆RATP is the change in rating points. INVG is a dummy variable that equals one if the pre-change rating is below investment grade, and is zero otherwise. CLASS is a dummy variable that equals one if the rating action is across class. ACINV is a dummy variable that equals one if the rating action is across investment grade. NA means not applicable. ***, **, *, and $ indicates significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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